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THE CONVERSION OF THE ATOM
NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND IDEOLOGY IN FRANCOIST SPAIN
XavieR Roqué
At the beginning of the atomic age, Francoist Spain launched an expensive project to develop, 
research and use nuclear energy. Scientists, the military and high-ranking officials in the 
administration mobilised to materialise a technoscientific dream with an international scope. The 
modernity of nuclear science contrasts with the reactionary ideology of the regime, but the paradox 
is only apparent because until now there has not necessarily been any historical relationship 
between science and democracy. The drive towards nuclear technoscience reveals the mutual 
construction of science and politics during the Cold War era and the different ways to appropriate 
and exploit the atom during the dictatorship.
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The study of the relationships between science, 
ideology and politics during Franco’s dictatorship 
revealed the existence of multiple forms of support 
between scientists, academics, journalists and 
members of the Administration. Recent research 
on evolutionism, chemistry or physics in Francoist 
Spain does not contrast scientific practice and 
ideological debate, rather, 
it analyses their mutual 
articulation (Anduaga, 2009; 
Florensa, 2013; Herran & Roqué, 
2012; Malet, 2008; Nieto-
Galan, 2013). In this article we 
will examine one of the most 
representative cases of co-
production of knowledge and 
power during the dictatorship: 
science and nuclear technology. 
On 6 July 1965, the 
Spanish Minister of Industry, 
Gregorio López Bravo, detonated a dynamite 
charge in Almonacid de Zorita, Guadalajara, as 
a demonstration for the president of the Nuclear 
Energy Board, the ambassador of the United States 
in Spain, the president of the company Unión 
Eléctrica Madrileña and the bishop of Sigüenza-
Guadalajara. It marked the start of the construction 
of the José Cabrera power plant, the first nuclear 
plant in the country. According to the NO-DO1 from 
19 July, «the Minister was pleased with the active 
incorporation of Spain into the peaceful use of 
atomic energy» (NO-DO, 1965). 
The presence of scientific, political, industrial 
and ecclesiastical figures reveals the importance 
of the event and of the power dynamics prevalent 
in the dictatorship. However, 
the most telling picture of 
the day was taken not in the 
gallery of authorities, but in 
the Zorita Town Hall. This 
photograph, distributed by the 
news agency CIFRA, shows a 
group of residents in front of a 
model of the new power plant, 
overshadowed by a banner with 
the Francoist shield depicting 
the eagle and the yoke and 
arrows. An old woman dressed 
in black, an old man with a straw hat, and a man with 
the sleeves of his shirt rolled up and his hands resting 
on the back of a child contemplate the model as if it 
1   Acronym for Noticiarios y Documentales (Newsreels and Documentary 
films), a series of audio-visual programmes produced by the Franco 
regime as propaganda; their showing in cinemas before the feature film 
was compulsory.
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was a Nativity scene, while a man with a cap smokes 
indifferently.
Through the public exhibition of its technological 
prowess, covered in its own symbols, the regime entered 
the atomic age without renouncing its own ideology, 
and in the same way the first nuclear power plant was 
integrated into a traditional and historic landscape:
Nearby there are [...] some serious and austere Castilian-
looking moorlands and hillocks. The ruins of an old castle, 
with a church and its legends and memories of warriors. On 
the neighbouring La Oliva hill there was a Visigoth city; 
remarkable archaeological remains have been found there.
(Baró Quesada, 1968)
The nuclear power plant, in turn, transformed the 
landscape and updated the image of the regime and its 
allies. With the twentieth anniversary of Hiroshima 
coming in just a month, in public opinion the civilian 
use of atomic energy had neutralised the latent threat of 
a total nuclear conflict.
The Zorita plant is an example of the mutual 
construction of science, technology and politics 
during Francoist Spain, also evident in the Noguera 
Ribagorzana river dams, the rice varieties cultivated in 
the laboratory specifically for the Guadalquivir river 
delta, the uranium mining operations in the Andujar 
mountain range, or the new reinforced concrete building 
processes (Camprubí, 2014). Scientists and engineers 
actively collaborated in all these projects and the regime 
provided them with laboratories and resources which 
were selectively distributed, with hints of autocracy, 
based on Franco’s government’s priorities. In 1963, the 
first global study in Spain on the cost of education and 
research was carried out, as part of the preparations for 
the I Development Plan. Of the 1,513.8 million pesetas 
devoted to research and development, only 10.8 % was 
for fundamental research, while the rest was divided 
between applied research (47.5 %) and development 
(41.7 %). Of the 1,158.9 million pesetas invested in 
public research bodies, three sectors stood out: nuclear 
energy (25.9 %), biological sciences and agriculture 
(21.5 %), and geology and mining (14 %); together, these 
sectors accounted for almost two thirds of the overall 
expense (Romero & Santesmases, 2008; Roqué, 2012).
Exploitation of the atom was, therefore, a priority 
in Franco’s Spain, as in other countries that wanted to 
use nuclear energy to recover their glory (like Fourth-
Republic France) or become a nation (like postcolonial 
India). Here, we are interested in the distinctive features 
of a project that required not only enormous investments, 
qualified technicians, radioactive fuel, and international 
relationships, but also the alignment, conversion, and 
capitalisation of the atom by the dictatorship.
n THE	PURIFICATION	OF	PHYSICS
Before the first atoms of Spanish uranium, which 
had been enriched in the United States, were split at 
the Zorita reactor, the regime had to reconcile them 
with its own national-Catholic vision of science. This 
process had two aspects, one better known than the 
other: the purification of people and institutions, and 
the ideological appropriation of new theories on the 
subject.
The victory over the Republic gave the Francoist 
government control over Spanish institutions and the 
scientific community. The Board for the Extension of 
Studies and Research (JAE, for its Spanish acronym), 
the national body created in 1907 to promote scientific 
activity and exchange with other countries, was 
eliminated to create the Spanish National Research 
Council (CSIC, for its Spanish acronym), in order 
to «link scientific production with the spiritual and 
material interests of the Homeland» (decree for the 
creation of the CSIC, 24 November 1939). The exile, 
or purging, of the university staff led to the loss of 
almost half of the active chairs in 1936. The regime 
took advantage of this void to systematically build 
and model the scientific community after the war and 
during the post-war period. As the author of the most 
detailed study about the destruction of the Spanish 
university system by Franco points out, «the professors 





















































who created the real and long-lasting wasteland [...] 
because ideology overtook science and had forty years 
to perpetuate itself» (Claret Miranda, 2006, p. 360).
Two key people in the nuclear project and in Spanish 
science policy thrived professionally in this context. The 
naval engineer José María Otero Navascués (1907-1983), 
a military specialist in optics, who rose to prominence 
as a figure in Spanish physics from the end of the war to 
the 1960s. Otero became the president of the National 
Physics Council and the Nuclear 
Energy Board (JEN, for its Spanish 
acronym), represented Spain 
as part of international physics 
bodies, and was the president of 
the International Committee for 
Weights and Measures from 1968 
to 1976. One of his disciples, the 
Full Professor of Atomic and 
Nuclear Physics Carlos Sánchez 
del Río (1924-2013), who worked 
with him at the JEN, was the 
general director of Science Policy 
at the Ministry of Education and 
Science, and was the president of 
the CSIC during the Spanish transition to democracy. As 
we shall see, both practiced physics from the perspective 
of scientific humanism, based on the epistemological 
limitations of the discipline, a perspective that began to 
take shape before the war.
n THE	CONVERSION	OF	THE	ATOM
For the right-wing ideologists that undermined the 
Republic during the 1930s and set the stage for the 
military rebellion, science and technology were 
modernity idols and agents of culture subversion. 
Physics, in particular, promoted materialism and 
atheism through its image of a mechanical world with 
no soul or spirit, where matter was able to evolve 
and organise itself without the 
Creator.
Concern over the monstrosity 
of science was accentuated at 
the beginning of the atomic age. 
References to the Apocalypse 
are common in many countries 
after the nuclear attacks against 
Japan, but in Spain they acquired 
a very obvious literal sense 
in the texts of one of the first 
atomic communicators, the Jesuit 
astronomer Ignacio Puig. In La 
energía nuclear. Las bombas A, 
H y C (“Nuclear energy. A, H and 
C bombs”), Puig foresaw «the possibility of the world 
ending because of nuclear energy» and comforted 
himself with the idea that the annihilation of humanity 
due to the abuse of natural forces would perfectly fit 
«the designs of Divine providence», as a catastrophic 
«THROUGH THE PUBLIC 
EXHIBITION OF ITS 
TECHNOLOGICAL PROWESS, 
COVERED IN ITS OWN 
SYMBOLS, THE REGIME 
ENTERED THE ATOMIC AGE 





















































end of the world resulting from a natural cataclysm 
(Puig, 1954, p. 413).
This view of science represented a problem for 
a regime that could not abandon the use of such a 
powerful weapon in an ideological and economic 
battle. The answer was the spiritualisation of science 
by integrating it into a single Christian tree of 
knowledge. This appropriation manoeuvre, explicitly 
expressed in the decree for the creation of the CSIC, 
found support, according to modern reactionaries, in 
contemporary physics theories, because relativity 
and quantum mechanics proved the failure of the 
rigidly deterministic universe of classical physics. The 
physicist José García Santesmases (1907-1989) wrote in 
his public examination report in 1944:
In the current century, physics [...] has experienced an 
unexpected and wonderful transformation. There has 
been a spiritual revolution, but one under the banner 
of tradition, equally separated from idealism and 
materialism, and establishing an intimate and mysterious 
rapport between matter and spirit.
(Otero Carvajal, 2014, p. 144)
The physicist Julio Palacios insisted in 1947: 
«Everyone speaks about a crisis in physics because it 
has stopped being rational and has become what we 
could call a mystical doctrine, based on principles 
that are inaccessible to reason» (Palacios, 1947, p. 
15). These are only two of the many references to 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and to the non-
causality of the scientific humanist discourse during the 
dictatorship, exemplified by Otero and Sánchez del Río. 
It was not simply a matter of taking a metaphysical 
stance, because this form of humanism materialised in 
the management of the nuclear project and in Spanish 
research (Herran & Roqué, 2012; 2013).
n ATOMS	FOR	PEACE
Once physics was reconciled, the atomic dream was 
spurred on by the existence of national uranium 
deposits. The Board of Atomic Research was created 
in 1948; it was a private institution that became public 
in 1951 as the JEN. The JEN promoted research 
and training in physics and nuclear technology, and 
coordinated efforts to search for and mine uranium, 
but its relationship with scientists and foreign 
institutions was intense from the start. The signing of 
the USA-Spain agreements in 1953, which included 
the installation of military bases in Spain, contributed 
to Spain’s incorporation in the international isotope 
distribution programme Atoms for Peace, launched by 
the Eisenhower administration to promote a benign 
image for the atom and to achieve world hegemony for 
the North-American nuclear industry (Krige, 2006). 
Otero Navascués and Sánchez del Río, as members of 
the JEN, would be part of the Spanish delegation to 
the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of 
Atomic Energy in Geneva (August, 1955), along with 
representatives from the Ministry and executives and 
engineers from the electricity industry (Romero de 
Pablos, 2012; Romero de Pablos & Sánchez Ron, 2001).
While the companies and financial partnerships 
that would support the national atomic industry were 
created in Spain, the JEN negotiated Spain’s admission 
to the CERN (acronym for its original French name, 
European Council for Nuclear Research, now the 
European Organization for Nuclear Research), a key 
research institution for European construction after 
World War II. Spain joined in 1961, after negotiating 





























































the research culture of Spanish 
scientists and their European 
colleagues, together with the lack 
of contracts for Spanish companies 
and the progressive increase in the 
membership-continuity fee, led 
Spanish authorities to question 
the advantages of remaining part 
of the institution. In 1963, Spain 
contributed 55.7 million pesetas to the CERN, almost 
a third of the whole national budget for fundamental 
research. It was a huge amount compared to the 14 
million pesetas devoted to mathematics and astronomy 
research, or the 17.4 million pesetas devoted to medical 
research, but it pales in comparison to the 300 million 
pesetas devoted to nuclear energy itself.
n TO	BE,	OR	NOT	TO	BE	A	CERN	MEMBER
As the general director of the JEN since its creation 
and its president since 1958, Otero faced the challenge 
of simultaneously maintaining Spain’s connection 
both to the CERN (essential for the budding Spanish 
community of high-energy physicists) and to a 
nuclear project in its execution phase. The question 
of maintaining membership ended up in the hands of 
a divided inter-ministerial committee. The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs was in favour, but the Ministry of 
Finance considered the links to European fundamental 
research less important than the energy needs of an 
expanding economy. In August 1968, the Spanish 
government communicated their intention to leave 
the institution to the CERN. The decision was widely 
discussed in the press, especially after the cabinet 
confirmed it on 8 November 1968, and it sparked 
a response in Madrid and Barcelona universities, 
where students and professors participated in acts of 
protest in the science faculties. The reaction, however, 
was not unanimous. While the Full Professor of 
Thermodynamics at the Central University subscribed 
to the opinion that CERN «was bad business for 
Spain», the Faculty of Science at the University of 
Barcelona published a statement denouncing the harm 
leaving would mean for Spanish universities and 
research (Riquer, 2010; Roqué, 2012).
Meanwhile, Zorita prepared for the Supreme 
Commander’s (Franco’s) visit, scheduled for 12 
December. The inauguration of the José Cabrera power 
plant featured the unexpected presence of Bernard 
Gregory, director of the CERN. In Madrid, Gregory 
had been maintaining conversations with Spanish 
high-energy physicists and with 
the Minister of Education, José 
Luis Villar Palasí, in order to 
guarantee Spain’s continuity 
within the organisation. Their 
work had immediate effects 
and the withdrawal request was 
provisionally halted. But the 
decision was already taken, and 
the Ministries of Education, 
Science and Industry issued 
official statements on the matter. The government had 
decided to reduce their participation in the CERN and 
committed themselves to the industrial development of 
nuclear energy. Therefore, the funds that, until then, had 
been intended for «a pure research institution» could be 
devoted to obtaining «practical results, with more social 
adjustability, in the shorter term» (Abc, 1969).
n CONCLUSIONS
In 1938 the North-American sociologist Robert K. 
Merton defended the ethical coherence between science 
and democracy: «The conflict between the totalitarian 
state and the scientist derives in part, then, from an 
incompatibility between the ethics of science and 
the new political code which is imposed upon us all» 
(Merton, 1973, p. 258). His reflection was motivated 
«ZORITA IS AN EXAMPLE OF 
THE MUTUAL CONSTRUCTION 
OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY 












by the changes in innovation, education and research 
systems in countries that competed for scientific and 
economic hegemony with conflicting organisation 
models (Pestre, 2008; Shinn, 2002). Although the 
Mertonian ideal of universal, democratic, communal 
and altruistic science became unsustainable during the 
Cold War era, it still conditioned the perspective on 
science in non-democratic regimes.
In the case of Francoism, the general opinion 
was that there was no real science, or that science 
was done despite the regime. Sánchez del Río, for 
instance, considered that the ideological intervention 
of science was superficial and that the scientific policy 
of the regime was beneficial and not very intrusive, 
to the point that it showed some 
continuity with the science of the 
Republic. In an article written in 
1990 on the fiftieth anniversary 
of the creation of the CSIC, he 
lamented the scientific exile 
caused by the war but warned 
about «the description of such 
a regrettable situation by some 
very unobjective current-day historians. Because not 
everyone who left was valuable and not everyone 
who stayed was incompetent. There was a mixture of 
everything, logically, because talent and the capacity to 
work do not have a monopoly on any specific political 
ideology». An impartial analyst should not be blinded 
by «imperial phraseology and [...] symbolic images», 
because Spanish science was only politicised towards 
the end of the Francoist era, especially at universities, 
«where the mixture of opponents to the regime and 
the spirit of 1968 made any serious work impossible» 
(Sánchez del Río, 1995, pp. 261 and 264).
However, science and politics are, as we have seen, 
a precious resource to each other, even in totalitarian 
systems, where the emphasis on ideological distortion 
has overshadowed other debates. What space was 
there for scientific practice, apart from within the 
designs of Franco’s regime? How did exiled scientists 
or those who worked abroad interact with the scientists 
who trained in Spain after the war? What elements 
of scientific and industrial infrastructure created 
during the dictatorship were continued in democracy? 
An approach to these and other questions needs to 
transcend the idealised vision of the nature of science 
and its political relations.
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